Researching the Future of C-UAV and C-RAM

2024-11-27 17:46

The threat landscape today is quite broad, ranging from medium-sized reconnaissance and attack aircraft to small and micro unmanned aerial vehicles. Some of these small and medium-sized aircraft are manufactured for military applications, but recent conflicts have shown that commercial and consumer-oriented civilian drones can be easily reconfigured to perform combat and combat support missions. The tactical unmanned aerial vehicle category (commonly referred to in the United States as "Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems" (STUAS)) has been particularly prevalent in recent conflicts, partly due to its low cost, high availability, and relative ease of use. In 2021, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) General Kenneth McKenzie, described the proliferation of tactical drones as the "most concerning tactical development" since the rise of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during the Iraq conflict. "I think we are seeing the rise of a new ingredient in warfare," McKenzie said. His assessment sounds correct. In intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), small to ultra-small drones can approach enemy formations at a relatively low risk of detection, providing information on troop movements, or performing locating, fire correction, and battle damage assessment for artillery. Electronic reconnaissance and offensive electronic warfare (EW) are additional tasks for drones. In attack missions, even small commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hobbyist drones can be configured to carry and release munitions against enemy forces, or act as loitering munitions (LM; commonly known as "suicide drones" or "kamikaze drones"), carrying explosives along the way. Such LMs can patrol a specific area until they detect a sufficiently valuable opportunity target. They then effectively transition from surveillance drones to precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

Ukraine – The Largest Drone War

Conflicts over the past two decades have highlighted the increasingly important role of drones in armed forces worldwide. Ten years ago, during the ISIS/Daesh insurgency in Iraq, the significant impact of improvised COTS systems was first fully demonstrated (although various other irregular forces also discovered their uses around the same time). The ongoing war in Ukraine has reached a new level of intensity, with drones and artillery being among the most important weapon systems deployed on the battlefield. Over the past two years, tens of thousands of drones have been launched, making this drone war unprecedented. Fixed-wing, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and inertial navigation system (INS) guided medium-sized unmanned aerial systems, such as Iran's Shahed 131 and 136, can strike fixed infrastructure targets; while those equipped with electro-optical/infrared (IR) sensors, such as Turkey's Bayraktar TB2, can attack moving military vehicles with guided bombs and missiles. Ukraine's domestically produced AQ 400 Kosa drone has a payload of 32 kilograms with sufficient range to reach Moscow, and a payload of 65 kilograms over shorter distances. Kyiv plans to increase production to 500 units per month. More small drones are targeting soldiers in foxholes and trenches, as they are largely protected from other battlefield threats. Modified COTS-based quadcopters can attack individually or in swarms, and can also destroy armored vehicles and even main battle tanks (MBTs). Many small drones are radio-controlled via radio frequency (RF) links. These include so-called first-person view (FPV) drones, which can effectively serve as improvised LMs – the onboard camera provides the operator with a pilot's perspective, enabling very precise target selection, and even allowing the aircraft to fly through doorways or into open vehicle compartments. Notably, operating RF-controlled drones does not require extensive training; COTS systems are designed for ease of use, and any country where teenagers grew up playing video games will have a large pool of potential pilots. More advanced aircraft, usually purpose-built for the military, use GNSS and/or INS to execute pre-programmed reconnaissance or strike missions with minimal direct supervision. Since onboard databases can actively identify legitimate targets, some LMs can exhibit target autonomy. Even if radio contact with the control station is jammed, they can still conduct attacks.

C-UAV and C-RAM Requirements
Traditional missile air defense systems are well suited for shooting down large to medium-sized, sophisticated military drones and larger LMs, such as the Shahed series. However, they are not a viable counter-drone option against small drone threats. Even if the latter can be detected within the engagement zones of very short-range air defense/short-range air defense (VSHORAD/SHORAD) systems, their mass employment capability can quickly exhaust (V)SHORAD magazines, leaving protected units vulnerable to more advanced aircraft or missiles. Cost asymmetry also makes conventional air defense systems economically unsustainable against such threats. To understand the extent of this asymmetry, CBS News reported in May 2023 that a single FIM-92 "Stinger" series missile costs over $400,000. A typical off-the-shelf small drone, such as a DJI quadcopter, costs only a few hundred dollars. To date, RF jamming remains the most widely used (and arguably most effective) weapon against small drones. RF jamming works by interfering with the aircraft's navigation and control systems, either by preventing reception of command signals from the control station or by blocking satellite navigation frequencies to disrupt GNSS guidance. Depending on the strength of the jamming system, its effects can be scaled in intensity as well as in the width and depth of the targeted airspace. In Ukraine, both sides have deployed extensive jamming equipment to protect their positions from enemy aircraft and to suppress enemy drone capabilities before offensive operations. Powerful EW systems can be mounted at fixed sites or on vehicles, making them easy to retarget. Lower-echelon tactical units are equipped with portable jammers, while jammers are mounted on the turret tops of tanks and other vehicles. However, EW-based countermeasures have some weaknesses. Frequency hopping is often a simple and effective way to evade RF jamming. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Ukrainian attacks on Russian EW sites, jammer signals can be triangulated, allowing them to be located and targeted by artillery, airdropped bombs, or missiles. Increased autonomy and the introduction of redundant navigation systems are expected to reduce the impact of future RF jamming, but this is not absolute. Some drones will continue to rely on RF data links for remote control, receiving mission updates, or transmitting situational awareness data back to operators. Even as other anti-jam navigation systems become more common, GNSS will remain an important navigation tool. Even if jamming does not completely disable vehicle control or navigation, it can still negatively affect drone effectiveness. Electromagnetic jamming technology is expected to continue developing, improving signal strength, range, and effectiveness, and using smaller portions of the electromagnetic spectrum to minimize collateral impact on friendly systems. The Pentagon plans to field jamming capabilities at lower echelons, particularly at the platoon level, and is already experimenting with installing EW systems on light infantry vehicles, such as the U.S. Marine Corps' MRZR. Other armed forces are taking similar approaches. Improved jamming alone cannot offset the anticipated enhancements in tactical drone capabilities and operational concepts. Other kinetic technologies are also being actively explored. Some of these measures can also protect ground forces and installations from rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM). Such C-RAM systems overlap to a large degree functionally with C-UAV roles, making a system capable of performing both missions an attractive proposition.